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Two experiments investigated whether attention plays a role in iconic memory,
employing either a change detection paradigm (Experiment 1) or a partial-report paradigm
(Experiment 2). In each experiment, attention was taxed during initial display presentation,
focusing the manipulation on consolidation of information into iconic memory, prior to
transfer into working memory. Observers were able to maintain high levels of performance
(accuracy of change detection or categorization) even when concurrently performing an
easy visual search task (low load). However, when the concurrent search was made
difficult (high load), observers’ performance dropped to almost chance levels, while
search accuracy held at single-task levels. The effects of attentional load remained
the same across paradigms. The results suggest that, without attention, participants
consolidate in iconic memory only gross representations of the visual scene, information
too impoverished for successful detection of perceptual change or categorization of
features.
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INTRODUCTION
The standard model of iconic memory considers it a pre-attentive
store of visual information (Sperling, 1960). Here, we evalu-
ated this model using two distinct paradigms. In the traditional
paradigm, iconic memory of letters or digits is measured using
partial-report (Sperling, 1960; Averbach and Coriell, 1961); more
recent tests have expanded the stimulus set to include col-
ors (Houtkamp and Braun, 2010), orientations (Houtkamp and
Braun, 2010; Sergent et al., 2011) and shapes (Ruff et al., 2007).
A new paradigm, the cued change detection task (Becker et al.,
2000; Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008, 2010), has proven
especially effective in capturing the initial coding of information
in iconic memory. The goal of the current study was to use both
partial-report and cued change detection to address the ques-
tion of whether attention mediates the formation of early iconic
representations.
People frequently fail to notice change between two visual
images, even when the change is relatively large. One explanation
for such instances of “change blindness” (Rensink, 2002; Simons
and Rensink, 2005) links the phenomenon to capacity limita-
tions in visual scene perception (Rensink et al., 1997; O’Regan
and Noë, 2001). On this account, limited attentional resources
are available to encode the initial display in its entirety, leaving
insufficient information to detect the image change. Consistent
with this idea, the number of items people are able to moni-
tor for change (i.e., approximately four; Luck and Vogel, 1997;
Pashler, 1988; Rensink, 2000) closely matches estimates of capac-
ity, in either attention (Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988; Rensink,
2000; Scholl, 2000) or working memory (Cowan, 2001). Further
support is found in multi-unit recordings of monkey area V1
during change detection, which reveal a close correspondence
between the neural activity elicited by the initial display and
successful task performance (Landman et al., 2004). Likewise, in
humans, the magnitude of event related potentials (ERPs) elicited
by the initial display under different attentional manipulations
predicts accuracy of change detection (Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2005).
A competing explanation is rooted in interpretations of the
now classic experiments of George Sperling (Sperling, 1960) using
a partial-report procedure, which revealed that, when post-cued,
observers could accurately report any item from a brief multi-
item visual display. Sperling concluded that the brief display was
stored in an iconic memory, a pre-attentive, large capacity repos-
itory of detailed visual information, which required attention
(post-cue) to transfer a subset of the information into a more
durable form for inspection in working memory. Change blind-
ness can thus be understood as the disruption of iconic memory
(Becker et al., 2000; Landman et al., 2003). On this view, the inter-
vening interval between images masks or overwrites the iconic
memory of the initial image, leaving too sparse a representation
to detect the image change.
Participants performing partial-report tasks often comment
spontaneously that they seem to see all of the items in the dis-
play, but are unable to report them all due to forgetting. Such
reflections imply that we experience more than we can report,
and we report only what is attended. Several popular theories of
consciousness have emerged from this view (Block, 1990; Lamme,
2003)1. For example, Lamme (Lamme, 2003) proposed that atten-
tion operates at a stage conceptually and operationally distinct
from that required for conscious perception: we are conscious
1For the purposes of the present study, we define attention as spatial and top-
down selection, and consciousness as the subjective experience or visibility of
stimuli.
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of many different visual inputs, however, attention allows only
behavioral reporting, playing no role in whether visual informa-
tion reaches a conscious state. Indeed, recent investigations using
ERPs and magnetoenchephalography (MEGs) suggest that the
earliest neural correlates of visual awareness, including the visual
awareness negativity component (VAN; Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2003), function independently of spatial attention (Koivisto and
Revonsuo, 2007; Wyart et al., 2011). In one study of change
blindness that provided evidence consistent with this proposal,
Landman et al. (Landman et al., 2003) cued participants dur-
ing the intervening interval on the item changed between images.
They found that the cue dramatically improved change detec-
tion for as long as 1.5 s after the initial display disappeared (see
also Becker et al., 2000; Hollingworth, 2003). Reminiscent of
Sperling’s (Sperling, 1960) seminal results (see also Coltheart
et al., 1974; Coltheart, 1980), the authors concluded that par-
ticipants had awareness of roughly the entire visual scene, with
attention acting to select from this rich, fleeting representation
items to be stored in working memory.
Block (Block, 1990, 2005) advanced a similar proposal,
drawing a distinction between “phenomenal” consciousness—
detailed and possibly unlimited in capacity—and “access”
consciousness—limited to the “consumer” information residing
in the brain’s systems of memory, reasoning, planning, and ratio-
nal control of action. Possible neural correlates link phenomenal
consciousness to posterior brain regions (e.g., visual cortex) and
access consciousness to anterior regions (e.g., prefrontal cortex,
see Lamme, 2006; Goodale, 2007). From this perspective, phe-
nomenal consciousness simply “overflows” access consciousness.
Although several extant experiments are consistent with Block’s
idea (Becker et al., 2000; Landman et al., 2003), in none was atten-
tion manipulated during presentation of the initial image. And
although strong evidence exists for the role of attention in trans-
ferring information to working memory, it is unclear whether
attention is required to create the initial iconic representation.
The purpose of the current study was to carry out this crucial
manipulation in two separate experiments. In the first experi-
ment we followed recent examples (e.g., Landman et al., 2003)
in using a cued change detection task to measure participants’
baseline ability to form an iconic memory of an initial visual dis-
play. This is an attractive paradigm because the comparison task
enhances sensitivity to information encoded in the first display. In
a second experiment we employed the traditional partial-report
procedure (Sperling, 1960). In each case, we asked whether tax-
ing attentional resources during the display affects iconic memory
formation, thus representing an advance over previous studies
using these paradigms. To manipulate attention we introduced
a concurrent visual search task, which required participants to
divide attention with the iconic memory task. Visual search was
either easy, drawing relatively little on attentional resources, or
hard, drawing heavily on resources. If the availability of attention
is irrelevant in the formation of iconic memory representations,
then visual search should leave change blindness or partial-report
unaffected. However, if attention and consciousness are inter-
related and perhaps even synonymous, as several authors have
claimed (Posner, 1994; Prinz, 2000; O’Regan and Noë, 2001),
then the formation of iconic memories (and, by implication,
phenomenal consciousness) requires attention, which in the cur-
rent study would cause instances of change blindness or report
failure to multiply as the demands of the visual search task
increase. Such results would demonstrate that, in the absence of
attention, participants had impoverished iconic memory repre-
sentations, which were insufficient for the successful transfer of
target items to working memory.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants
Twenty-four undergraduate students (12 female, ages 18–32,
M = 19.3) from the City College of the City University of New
York participated in the experiment for course credit. All students
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None reported a
history of neurologic illness, head trauma, or psychiatric illness.
All participants were given written informed consent according to
institutional guidelines prior to testing. The City College Human
Research Review Committee approved the consent form, which
contained detailed information regarding the purpose, risks, and
benefits of participating.
Apparatus and stimuli
The stimuli appeared on a 16′′ CRT monitor (Sony Model G220)
with refresh rate of 100 Hz.
Visual search task. Stimuli for the visual search were a set of
eight small white circles, each subtending 0.65◦, presented within
a gray disk, subtending 3.4◦, superimposed on textured back-
ground (Figure 1). The positions of the circles were selected
randomly on each trial from a set of 10 predetermined positions.
In easy visual search, participants were asked to find a pegged cir-
cle (i.e., circle with attached white bar subtending 0.16◦ × 0.33◦)
among smooth distractor circles (i.e., no white bar), (Figure 1).
Conversely, in hard visual search, participants were asked to find
a smooth target circle among pegged distractor circles (attached
white bar subtending 0.16◦ × 0.16◦). In each condition, targets
appeared with probability 0.5.
Change detection task. Participants were asked to detect a
change between two displays in the orientation (vertical to hor-
izontal or vice versa) of one of eight rectangles. The rectangles,
each measuring 2.3◦ × 1.3◦ and offset from the background in
textural orientation (Figure 1, inset), appeared in an imaginary
circle (diameter = 5.1◦) at equally spaced positions. To prevent
grouping, the positions were randomly jittered ±0.8◦ in radial
direction.
Procedure
Participants sat in a dimly lit, sound attenuated testing cham-
ber at a viewing distance of 57 cm. Participants performed five
different tasks over the course of the experimental session, three
single-tasks (200 trials each) and two dual tasks (400 trials each).
The single-tasks were: (1) change detection alone, (2) easy visual
search alone and (3) hard visual search alone. The dual tasks
were (4) change detection with easy visual search and, (5) change
detection with hard visual search. Each of the five different tasks
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FIGURE 1 | An example of a trial sequence in Experiment 1. Here, visual search is easy and the change detection task includes a change. Rectangles in
vertical or horizontal orientation were composed of texture identical to background (inset).
included the display of circles (used in visual search) and the dis-
play of rectangles (used in change detection). This tack enabled
us to equate the amount and type of visual stimulation across
task conditions. Tasks were completed separately and presented in
blocks of 50 trials separated by short breaks. All participants first
completed a set of the three single-tasks, followed by the two dual
tasks. Order of tasks within each set and response assignments
were counterbalanced.
At trial onset a fixation cross subtending 0.2◦ appeared for
1000ms, followed immediately by a display of eight white cir-
cles, which remained displayed for 250ms. 50ms after circle
onset, eight randomly oriented rectangles appeared for 200ms
(see Figure 1). In visual search alone, a blank screen was then
shown with the question “Did you see the target?” until partic-
ipants made non-speeded “yes” or “no” responses to the target
circles, ignoring the rectangles.
In change detection alone, a cue—a yellow line subtending
1.9◦ × 0.13◦ at an eccentricity of 0.9◦—appeared for 100ms at
one of the eight positions previously occupied by a rectangle. Cue
location was determined randomly on each trial. The screen was
then made blank for 900ms, followed by a second display of eight
rectangles, which appeared for 250ms, with the orientation of the
rectangle at the cued location changing orientation on half of the
trials. All other rectangles were identical across the two displays.
A subsequent response prompt “Change?” signaled participants
to decide whether the rectangle in the cued location had changed
orientation. Trials were response terminated.
In the dual tasks, participants were required to attend to both
circles and rectangles, with the relevant task (search or change
detection) indicated on each trial only after the onset of the first
display (see Figure 1). Participants were instructed to maintain
high performance on visual search, while simultaneously attend-
ing to orientation change. The search prompt appeared with
probability 0.6 to ensure that performance on the search task was
maintained.
EXPERIMENT 2
Participants
The results of Experiment 1 were extremely robust: each of
the participants showed better performance in change detec-
tion during low load. Consequently, we elected to test relatively
fewer participants in Experiment 2. Six undergraduate students
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(3 female, ages 20–33, M = 24.7) from the City College of the
City University of New York participated in the experiment.
All students were neurologically normal individuals reporting
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants read and
signed a consent form approved by the City College IRB. None
participated in Experiment 1.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
The apparatus matched Experiment 1. In both single and dual
tasks, a checkerboard pattern mask presented centrally and
exactly overlapping the search array, appeared for 50ms imme-
diately after the display of circles and rectangles. In visual search
alone, the response prompt appeared immediately after the pat-
tern mask. The change detection task from Experiment 1 was
replaced with a partial-report task. In partial-report alone, the
pattern mask was followed by a yellow cue that appeared for
200ms at one of the eight positions previously occupied by a
rectangle. A subsequent response cue “V or H?” prompted partic-
ipants to decide whether the rectangle was oriented vertically or
horizontally. In the dual tasks, participants were again required
to attend to both circles and rectangles, with the relevant task
(search or partial-report) indicated on each trial immediately
after the offset of the pattern mask. All other aspects mimicked
Experiment 1.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1
To examine whether attention is required for iconic memory,
in our first experiment we paired a change detection task with
a visual search task. Participants were asked to detect change
in the orientation (vertical or horizontal) of a visual object
(rectangle). Attentional demands from the dual task were either
made easy—simultaneously searching for a readily seen target—
or made hard—searching for a less visible target. We were careful
to assess each participant’s baseline ability to detect change or
search targets bymeasuring performance in each task alone before
asking participants to perform dual tasks. In this way, we could
gauge any decrements in change detection performance from
adding an easy dual task (easy search), and then any further
decrements that accompany a difficult dual task (hard search).
Change detection should be unaffected by the attentional load
manipulation if attention is uninvolved in the formation of iconic
memories.
We first performed a series of manipulation checks. A com-
parison of the visual search tasks performed alone indicated that
we were successful in manipulating attentional load: accuracy
during easy visual search (M = 98.88%, SD= 2.59%) was sig-
nificantly higher than during hard visual search (M = 69.40%,
SD= 5.54%), t(23)= 21.42, p < 0.001. We also found that par-
ticipants were able to maintain high accuracy when performing
change detection alone (M = 87.85%, SD= 5.90%), a result con-
sistent with previous studies indicating improved performance
when the change location is cued (Becker et al., 2000; Landman
et al., 2003). Finally, we found that participants were able to main-
tain search accuracy under dual task conditions: as shown in
Figure 2A, there was no difference in visual search performance
between single and dual conditions in either easy, t(23)= 0.19,
p= 0.851, or hard, t(23)= 1.35, p= 0.190, search tasks.
The primary analyses involved evaluating the effects of atten-
tional load on change detection under dual task conditions.
Figure 2B depicts performance in change detection as a func-
tion of load. We found that the accuracy of detecting change
fell from single-task performance (M = 87.85%, SD = 5.90%)
when paired with easy visual search (M = 76.35%, SD = 7.16%),
t(23) = 8.83, p < 0.001. Yet the more appropriate comparison is
between the two dual task conditions (low vs. high load), as any
dual task condition is more demanding than a single-task con-
dition (e.g., in requiring that two sets of instructions be held in
memory). Here, change detection dropped to near-chance lev-
els when paired with hard visual search (M = 59.83%, SD =
5.43%). The difference in change detection when paired with easy
or hard search was highly significant, t(23) = 12.81, p < 0.001.
Importantly, each of the individual participants revealed an iden-
tical pattern of performance. These results are in line with the
FIGURE 2 | (A) Accuracy for visual search for single and dual tasks as a function of search type in Experiment 1. (B) Change detection accuracy in dual tasks as
a function of attentional load in Experiment 1.
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view that the formation of an iconic memory of object orientation
is impaired when attentional resources are reduced.
EXPERIMENT 2
Although the cued change detection task (Experiment 1) is now
a common technique to probe iconic memory formation (Becker
et al., 2000; Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008, 2010) it is
unlike the partial-report task Sperling (1960) used in his sem-
inal studies of iconic memory because the former requires a
comparison between two images presented sequentially. This key
procedural difference invites another interpretation of our results:
perhaps attentional load undermined the process of comparing
the first and second displays, leaving untouched the iconic image
of the first display (see Simons et al., 2002; Mitroff et al., 2004).
To be sure, a previous study (Landman et al., 2003), which used
our identical paradigm, has already ruled this explanation out;
it also is highly unlikely that attentional resources could inter-
fere with comparison processes 1.5 s later. Nevertheless, we felt
compelled in Experiment 2 to confront this alternative directly.
We also considered here the possibility that the cue used to query
change was relatively ineffective under high load, even though the
cue’s very appearance, which masked the search array, made con-
tinued search irrelevant. Either of these alternatives is consistent
with the findings of the Experiment 1.
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to address these alterna-
tive explanations using a reporting procedure closer in spirit to
that employed by Sperling (1960). Here, we eliminated the sec-
ond display entirely, instead asking participants merely to report
the orientation of the cued rectangle in the first (now, the only)
display. To ensure that participants were able to use the cue effec-
tively we doubled its duration from 100ms to 200ms. Finally,
to ensure that the iconic image formed to the rectangles for
partial-report did not also include the search items, a pattern
mask spatially overlapping only the search items appeared imme-
diately after the display. Thus, participants could not continue
searching the array once the reporting cue appeared. If attentional
load disrupts partial-report in this modified Sperling paradigm, it
will have provided especially strong and convergent evidence that
iconic memory formation requires attention.
Presentation of the pattern mask had no discernible effect
on visual search performance. As in the previous experiment,
participants were significantly more accurate when search was
easy (M = 99.42%, SD = 0.49%) than when it was hard (M =
68.33%, SD = 5.95%), t(5) = 13.17, p < 0.001. Once again we
found that, search performance was virtually identical between
single and dual tasks (Figure 3A) whether search was easy,
t(5) = 0.94, p = 0.393, or hard, t(5) = −0.51, p = 0.635. We
also again found that the accuracy of performance (here, cate-
gorization using partial-report) fell from single-task levels (M =
81.92%, SD = 6.78%) when coupled with easy visual search
(M = 70.08%, SD = 10.88%), t(5) = 2.77, p = 0.039, but was
indistinguishable from chance responding when coupled with
hard visual search (M = 52.70%, SD = 4.41%), a difference
that was highly significant t(5) = 5.26, p = 0.003 (Figure 3B).
Moreover, as in Experiment 1, each of the individual partici-
pants evinced the same pattern of performance. In replicating the
results of our previous experiment within a traditional partial-
report paradigm, Experiment 2 effectively rules out the two chief
alternative explanations of attentional load on change detec-
tion: disruption to comparison processes and ineffectiveness of
reporting cue. The current results instead support the view that
attention is required in the formation of iconic memories, an
explanation that captures parsimoniously the principal findings
of both experiments.
DISCUSSION
Two experiments investigated the role of attention in forming
iconic representations. In each, attention was taxed during initial
display presentation, focusing the manipulation on the consoli-
dation of information into iconic memory, prior to transfer into
working memory. Observers were able to maintain high levels
of accuracy even when concurrently performing an easy visual
FIGURE 3 | (A) Accuracy for visual search for single and dual tasks as a function of search type in Experiment 2. (B) Partial-report accuracy in dual tasks as a
function of attentional load in Experiment 2.
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search task (low attentional load). However, when the concur-
rent search was made difficult (high attentional load), observers’
performance dropped to almost chance levels, whereas search
accuracy nevertheless remained at single-task levels. Moreover,
the effects of attentional load were essentially the same whether
observers were asked to detect change (Experiment 1) or to cat-
egorize features using traditional partial-report (Experiment 2).
These results suggest that, without attention, participants consol-
idate in iconic memory only gross representations of the visual
scene.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Several recent theories of consciousness embrace a conceptual
division between access consciousness and phenomenal con-
sciousness (Block, 1990, 2005; Lamme, 2003). Access conscious-
ness involves reportable experience, which is directly accessible,
requires attention, and is severely limited in capacity. By con-
trast, phenomenal consciousness is thought to be pre-attentive,
not directly accessible, and large, possibly unlimited, in capacity.
Lamme (Lamme, 2003), for example, claims that attention is nec-
essary only for experiential reporting (i.e., access consciousness),
and so is dispensable for phenomenal consciousness. The clas-
sic experiments investigating iconic memory (Sperling, 1960), as
well as more recent behavioral (Coltheart et al., 1974; Coltheart,
1980; Becker et al., 2000; Landman et al., 2003) and electro-
physiological (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2007; Wyart et al., 2011)
demonstrations, undergird this theoretical perspective in suggest-
ing a separation between what humans experience and what they
are able to report. Yet the results of the present study are consis-
tent with the opposing view that phenomenal consciousness, like
access consciousness, depends heavily on attention.
Recent evidence from neuroimaging bears on these views.
Houtkamp and Brown (Houtkamp and Braun, 2010) measured
the magnitude of the BOLD response in primary visual cor-
tex (V1) and extrastriate cortex (V2) to a peripheral task (color
or orientation discrimination) under dual task conditions. They
concluded that attention acts to amplify already-formed iconic
traces. However, the investigators did not manipulate attention
to the central task, leaving unanswered the question of whether
attention modulates iconic trace formation. Sergent and col-
leagues (Sergent et al., 2011) found that the magnitude of neural
activation in visual areas V1 and V2 to the initial stimulus display
predicted the accuracy of partial-report. These results are con-
sistent with a possible role for attention in forming the display’s
iconic trace, as are the recent results of Koivisto and colleagues
showing modulation by attention of early ERP correlates of con-
sciousness in the occipital region (Koivisto et al., 2009). As in our
study, both of these studies employed strong attentional manip-
ulations. We believe that the inconsistency in demonstrating the
role of attention on neural correlates of consciousness is due in
part to the varying effectiveness of the attentional manipulations
used across studies.
We recognize that our conclusions concerning the role of
attention in phenomenal consciousness rests on the assumption
that iconic memory is a form of phenomenal consciousness. Still,
to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to evalu-
ate rigorously the role of attention in phenomenal consciousness
by manipulating attentional load during the time of the iconic
image formation (cf. Braun and Julesz, 1998; Li et al., 2002).
We found in both experiments that iconic image formation was
severely disrupted by an increase in attentional load, indexed by
a significant drop in change detection or categorization. In fit-
ting the view that phenomenal consciousness relies heavily upon
attention, our results suggest an intimate relationship between
consciousness and attention (see also Posner, 1994; Merikle and
Joordens, 1997; Prinz, 2000; O’Regan and Noë, 2001). Indeed, our
results essentially undo the conceptual distinction between phe-
nomenal and access consciousness (cf. Kouider et al., 2010). As
an alternative, we propose that consciousness is best conceived as
a binary phenomenon, with the contents of consciousness vary-
ing along a continuous scale. Here, consciousness always requires
attention, though we leave open the possibility that attention and
consciousness are fully distinct phenomena (Koch and Tsuchiya,
2007).
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
One might advance other interpretations of our findings. Perhaps
attention is unnecessary to actually form iconic memories, but
the diversion of attention accelerates subsequent memory decay
or forgetting. In this case, hard visual search might be said to have
a more pronounced effect than easy visual search on the rate of
decay, leading to relatively poorer change detection under high
attentional load. Of course, our post-cue was immediate, leav-
ing little room for iconic decay. Moreover, investigators who have
tackled the question of iconic decay directly (e.g., Landman et al.,
2003) have shown that the rate of decay in iconic memory is unaf-
fected by attentional focus, enabling us to rule this explanation
out.
In the current study, we varied across experiments the delay
after the initial display in prompting a response, from 900ms
in Experiment 1 to 200ms in Experiment 2. This manipula-
tion offers an additional means to test the hypothesis of decay
in iconic memory, which implies that the information available
from the iconic store falls off with delay. We found, however, that
the pattern of performance was the same whether the response
prompt followed the display by 200ms or 900ms, demonstrat-
ing that attentional load influenced the intercept (i.e., memory
formation) rather than the slope (i.e., memory decay).
Another possibility is that attentional load differentially inter-
fered with the process of transfer after the formation of the iconic
image. Yet previous studies (Landman et al., 2003), as well as our
own pilot experiments, have demonstrated that iconic memory
representations in this paradigm persist for at least 500–1000ms
after the disappearance of display. We, therefore, think it highly
unlikely that the attentional loadmanipulation affected the trans-
fer of information.
Perhaps low attentional load afforded participants an opportu-
nity to foveate peripheral stimuli sequentially, yielding relatively
good task performance (change detection or partial-report) in
this condition. However, two points argue against differential eye
movements as an explanation of good performance during easy
search. First, our design employed presentation times too brief to
permit the sequential foveation of stimuli. Second, even if possi-
ble, sequential foveation here would actually have produced worse
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performance than constant fixation. The reason is that in both
experiments the target rectangle was not known in advance, but
instead required participants to wait until the cue appeared after
the rectangle display terminated (and, in Experiment 1, for a sec-
ond display to appear). Here, the optimal strategy is to fixate at the
center of the display, equidistant from all rectangles, to form an
iconic image of the set of rectangles. By contrast, looking directly
at any single rectangle would, on average, result in relatively poor
performance. Indeed, a recent ERP study found that during suc-
cessful change detection attention is spread across the display,
whereas during change blindness attention tends to be focused
on specific locations (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2005). Thus, our
finding of good performance during easy visual search rules out
differential eye movements as a potential confound in this study.
The current study considered only the effects of spatial atten-
tion on performance in iconic memory tasks. Yet experiments
investigating the effects of masking (Koivisto et al., 2005) have
demonstrated dissociation between consciousness and attention
for objects occupying a central spatial position. Thus, it is possi-
ble that the effects of object attention on the formation of iconic
memories are distinct from those of spatial attention. Future
experiments could investigate this possibility by examining the
effects of attentional load when the objects of search and change
or partial-report are spatially superimposed.
CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated in two experiments that the formation of
iconic memory, which traditionally is considered pre-attentive, is
disrupted when attention is diverted. We showed this in exper-
iments that required either detection of perceptual change or
categorization of features. Our data thus provide evidence that
phenomenal consciousness, although conceptually and theoret-
ically distinct from attention, still requires attention. The role
of attention, therefore, goes beyond the transfer from iconic to
working memory stores, suggesting that phenomenal conscious-
ness is indistinct from access consciousness.
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